Article 24
I. INTRODUCTION A. Background
Based on the provision of Article 24C of the 1945 Constitution, the Constitutional Court of Indonesia has the authority to try cases at the first and final level, the decisions of which shall be final, to conduct judicial review of laws against the Constitution, to settle disputes on authorities between state institutions whose powers are bestowed by the Constitution, to decide upon the dissolution of political parties, and to decide upon electoral disputes. The as an integrated system, constitute the further elaboration of the basic ideas and accordingly, they can be explained based on such basic ideas. Whereas the first requirement for every country applying the principles of rule of law and constitutional democracy is constitutionalism principle, namely the principle placing the constitution as the highest law, the substance of which is contained in the Fourth Paragraph of the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution, as the realization of the statement of the country's independence, which is reflected among others in the sentence, "…. According to Wasis Susetio, the presence of the Constitutional Court of Indonesia (Mahkamah Konstitusi-MK) in a new democracy, as an institution needed to strengthen and protect the human right in a transitional period, requires a careful and intelligent approach to avoid confrontations which are highly detrimental to the strengthening of its existence. MK must consider the opposition voiced by politicians and other state administrators who do not accept MK' s decisions so as not to relapse to the condition similar to the one prior to the reform era. Institutional strengthening by applying natural methods requires strategic approaches to certain cases, which are not only based on populist opinions. The progress made by the Indonesian Constitutional Court in the last three years has been remarkable, yet also caused a concern for many people and politicians. Such condition must be addressed prudently by the judge of the Constitutional Court. Prudence is needed to avoid being trapped in compliments and to carry out the action plan to gain public opinion that is favorable for the achievement of a consolidated democracy through the existence of MK, which serves as the checks and balances mechanism in a sound state administration system.
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With the role held by the Constitutional Court, it is important to understand the extent to which independence it has. As mentioned by Decision 005/PUU-
IV/2006
7 , in a democratic rule-of-law state, as outlined in Article 1 paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution that reads, "Indonesia shall be a rule-of-law state," the independence of courts and judges is an essential element of a rule-of-law state or rechtsstaat. Due to the importance of such principle, the conception of the division of power among the executive, legislative, and judicative institutions and the conception of judicial independence are perceived as fundamental notions and determined as one of the main elements of the constitution and serve as the spirit of the law itself.
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Even before the amendment to the 1945 Constitution, in which the principle of division of power was not adopted, the principle of the division and independence of judicial authorities had already confirmed, and it was reflected in Article 24 and its Elucidation. Now, after the first to fourth amendments to the 1945 Constitution, in which the branches of power of the state are divided based on the principle of checks and balances, mainly in the relation between the legislative and executive institutions, the division of judicative power from the influence of other branches of authority is more emphasized. Related to that, Yustina Trihoni Nalesti Dewi, et.al. wrote, constitutional reform becomes a driving force strengthening the independence of judicial power. The amendment to Article 24 of the 1945 Constitution surely has made Indonesian Judicial Authority gains legal legitimacy to run the full freedom that focuses on the independence of judges who are not influenced by other powers out of the structure of judicial power.
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B. Research Method
This paper intends to study the Constitutional Court of Indonesia as one of the state institutions conducting the independent judicial power to perform the judiciary to enforce law and justice to find out whether the Constitutional Court in exercising its constitutional authority can be independent. Also, this paper will examine not just institutional but also judges to understand current issues related to the role of ethics and conduct of judges.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Independence of Constitutional Court
In the reform era, Indonesia has taken comprehensive reform measures by bringing the sovereignty back to the hand of the people. The peak of such efforts was the amendments to the 1945 Constitution which were made within four explicitly averred that the judicial power shall be independent, that is to say, free from the influence of the executive. As a result of the third amendment to the 1945 Constitution, Article 24 (1) now reads as follows: "The judicial power shall be independent in administering justice so as to uphold the law and equality."
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In the opinion of Bagir Manan, the concept of independence of the judiciary is one of the cardinal principles of democracy.
15 Almost all literature or the views of legal scholars state that the independent power of the court is a strengthening tool for the implementation of democracy, and upholding the rule of law. Law states the judiciary shall be an independent authority to perform the bench to enforcing law and justice. Moreover, the Constitutional Court is one of the performers of the independent judicial power who plays a significant role in the enforcement of the constitution and the principle of the state based on the law by its authority and obligations as determined by the Constitution. Therefore, judicial independence must be protected against all pressures, influences, and intervention of any party whosoever. Judicial independence is an essential prerequisite for the realization of the purpose of a rule-of-law state and serves as the guarantee for the enforcement of law and justice. This principle is inherent in and must be reflected in the examination and decision-making process in every case and is closely related to the independence of courts as honorable, dignified, trustable legal institution. in the Constitution or the law of the country. It is the duty of all governmental and other institutions to respect and observe the independence of the judiciary; 4. There shall not be any inappropriate or unwarranted interference with the judicial process, nor shall judicial decisions by the courts be subject to revision. This principle is without prejudice to judicial review or to mitigation or commutation by competent authorities of sentences imposed by the judiciary, in accordance with the law; 7. It is the duty of each Member State to provide adequate resources to enable the judiciary to properly perform its functions; 14. The assignment of cases to judges within the court to which they belong is an internal matter of judicial administration. 15. The judiciary shall be bound by professional secrecy with regard to their deliberations and to confidential information acquired in the course of their duties other than in public proceedings, and shall not be compelled to testify on such matters. Related to that, Bagir Manan argues, the government system and organs, are not the only factors that would influence the independence of the judiciary, it is very much influenced by the social and cultural factors also. The culture of permissiveness or tolerance on the breach of law and social system are very significant in effect on the independence of judicial powers. Therefore, in the efforts to uphold the independent powers of the judiciary, besides managing a democratic government, as based on law, it is also crucial to maintain a social life and promote a culture of law obedience, and the respect for judges and judicial powers. The society also shall have access for acquiring judgments of the Constitutional Court.
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The Constitutional Court has the authority to adjudicate at the first and In the interest of the execution of authorities, the Constitutional Court has the power to summon a state official, government official, or a member of the society to provide information. 
No.
Constitutional Court Law Note 
B. Independence of Constitutional Judges
There are a number or international legal instruments that enshrine the with compensation or reward in the form of position, economic benefits, or other forms.
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Considering whereas the independence of judges is closely related to the impartiality of judges both in examination and decision-making process. A dependent judge cannot be expected to act neutral or impartially in performing his/her duties. Likewise, a judicial institution dependent to other organs in certain fields and unable to independently manage itself could also result in non-neutral attitude in performing its duties. Such independence also has different aspects. Functional Independence contains a prohibition for other branches of power to intervene with judges in performing their judicial duties. However, such independence must not be interpreted as absolute, because it is limited by law and justice. The aforementioned independence is also to be interpreted that judges are free to pass their verdicts in accordance with their beliefs based on legal interpretation, although verdicts based on such interpretation and belief may be contradictory to those having political and administrative powers. If the verdicts are not in line with the wish of the ruling party, it cannot be used as an excuse to affect retribution against judges, whether personally or against the authority of judicial institutions [". Such independence relates to the examination and decision-making process in cases faced by judges, to obtain verdicts that are free from pressure, influence, whether physical or psychical in nature, and corruption due to Corruption, Collusion, Nepotism, therefore, actually, such independence is not the privilege of judges, but an indispensable right or inherent right of justices in the context of ensuring the fulfillment of the human right of citizens to obtain fair trial. Therefore, mutually, judges are required to act independently and impartially to meet the human rights of justice seekers (justitiabelen). It automatically includes the right of magistrates to be free from pressures, influences, and threats. realized through supervision. However, the sensitivity level of judges is extremely high because two opposite parties are defending the interests of the conflicting parties. Therefore, the independence of judiciary also serves as, in addition to inherent right, a prerequisite for the impartial act of magistrates in performing judicial duties.
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The form of accountability demanded from judges requiring a format that can accommodate such sensitivity. Carelessness both in the formulation of responsibility mechanism in the kind of supervision and the implementation thereof may result in negative impacts to the existing judicial process. The necessary trust to require compliance with and acceptance to the verdicts made by judges is currently in a critical condition. However, the remaining low level of trust must be maintained to prevent it from complete lost. Therefore, the intention to keep the honor, dignity, and attitude of judges is, in fact, counterproductive and will eventually result in legal chaos. The pledge or promise shall be as follows:
The Oath of a Constitutional Court Justice "In the name of Allah I swear that I will do my best in fulfilling all obligations as a Constitutional Court Justice, and I will be as good and fair as possible, abide by the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, and apply all legislations and laws as strict as possible in accordance with the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, and serve the country and the nation." The Promise of a Constitutional Court Justice "I solemnly promise that I will do my best in fulfilling my obligations as a Constitutional Court Justice, and I will be, and I will be as good and fair as possible, abide by the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, and apply all legislations and laws as strict as possible in accordance with the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, and serve the country and the nation." The Constitutional Court has nine constitutional court justice members who shall be designated by a Decree of the President. The issuance of a Decree of the President in this provision is of an administrative character. The structure of the Constitutional Court consists of one chief justice being concurrently a member, one deputy chief justice being concurrently a member, and 7 (seven) constitutional court justice members. A constitutional court judge is a state official.
The constitutional court judges shall be proposed respectively 3 (three) people by the Supreme Court, 3 (three) people by the DPR, and 3 (three) people by the President. The candidacy of the constitutional court justices shall be executed transparently and participatory. A candidate constitutional court justice shall be published in print as well as electronic mass media so that the society can give input regarding the respective candidate justice.
The provisions relating to the procedures for the selection, election, and submission of the constitutional court judges shall be regulated by the individual authorized institutions. The election of the Constitutional Court judges shall be executed objectively and accountable. The term of office of a constitutional court justice is five years, and he/she can be re-elected only for one subsequent term of office.
Constitutional Court judge shall comply with the following conditions: a. He/ she shall have integrity and impeccable personality; b. He/she shall be just; and c.
He/she shall be a statesman/stateswoman having command over the constitution and constitutionalism. To be eligible for appointment as a constitutional court justice, besides having to comply with that conditions, a candidate constitutional court judge shall comply with the conditions: a. he/she shall be an Indonesian citizen; b. he/she shall hold a doctor's and a master's degree with a basis of an undergraduate's background of higher education in law; c. he/she shall have faith in God the One Only and be of noble character; d. he/she shall be of the age of at least 47 (forty-seven) years and at the highest of 65 (sixty-five) years at the first appointment; e. he/she shall be physically and mentally capable of performing his/her duties and obligations; f. he/she shall have never been sentenced to criminal imprisonment by a court judgment which has obtained permanent legal force; g. he/she is not being declared bankrupt by virtue of a court judgment; and h. he/she shall have work experience in the field of law of at least 15 (fifteen) years.
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Constitutional Court justice will be discharged honorably due to a. His/her demise; b. His/her resignation on own accord submitted to the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court; c. He/she reaches the age of 70 (seventy) The protocol status and the financial entitlements of the Chief Justice, the Deputy Chief Justice, and the members of the Constitutional Court shall be subject to the provisions of the statutory rules and regulations for state officials.
The state shall grant security guaranty for constitutional court justices in the exercise of their duties and responsibilities as executors of the judicial power.
A constitutional court judge is prohibited from holding office as a concurrently Hidayat is given a special warning. The Ethics Council ruled that the Chief Justice acted with a lack of prudence in issuing the letter of recommendation because it could create negative perceptions. Nevertheless, it did not find any gross violations of ethics and broadly accepted Chief Justice Hidayat's version of events.
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III. CONCLUSION
The independence of the Indonesian Constitutional Court supported by the 1945 Constitution after the amendments from 1999 until 2002, and further stipulated in Law. However, it can be said that this institution has ups and downs of public trust due to corruption cases conducted by constitutional justices. Also, in several political instances showed efforts of political institutions to limit the authority of the Constitutional Court. In its experiences, the Constitutional Court succeeded in convincing the parties through its decisions and strengthening institutional independence against the influence that tried to destabilize its institutions.
The Council of Ethics of Constitutional Judges to maintain the values and behavior of judges is also continuously work and efficient enough in overseeing the ethics and conduct of judges. The decision of the Ethics Council may also be accepted as a proportional decision. However, there are other issues that need to be studied more deeply, such as the political links between the tenure of the judge and the appointment of judges by the institution authorized by it, and the extent to which the independence of the Constitutional Court can be influenced by institutional leadership factors.
I agree with Fritz Edward Siregar that wrote, the Constitutional Court of Indonesia used the limited window that it had to drive political change and retain its legitimacy. 45 "Even though the Court was attacked, it continued to live with no consequences and gained even more public support. The Court has been bold enough to take this momentum and become one of the most respected and trustworthy institutions in Indonesia".
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